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INTRODUCTION
The role of religion in economic activity is 
an important issue and has long been the 
focus of extensive literature. According to 
Lagace (2001), how individuals combine 
personal religious values with business life 
is “one of the major fields that has not been 
much researched”. Recent studies have 
shown that religion influences personal 
behaviour and economic development 
(Jiang et al., 2015). However, it is still 
largely unclear how individual religious 
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beliefs affect company behaviour, such as 
the influence of the behaviour of the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) on investment 
decisions and a company’s capital structure. 
This is therefore an interesting topic to 
study.
Mismanagement in deciding capital 
structure, such as too high a proportion of 
debt or equity, will result in high capital costs. 
This situation can lead to low profitability 
and possible bankruptcy (Ahmed Sheikh & 
Wang, 2011; Brigham & Houston, 2004; 
Chadha & Sharma, 2015). To solve this 
problem management, one may have to 
commit fraudulent acts in the corporate 
financial statements due to the inability 
of the company to cover the high cost of 
capital. This situation is also driven by the 
company’s obligation to fulfil contractual 
clauses with creditors/investors by showing 
prospective profit and fulfilling the targeted 
Debt to Equity Ratio (DER) with liquid 
working capital. The cases of World Com. 
Inc, Enron and Kimia Farma Tbk indicate 
that the potential for fraud by management/
executives is related to incorrect decisions 
on capital structure (Scott, 2006).
The preferences and style of risk 
management played a role in the combination 
of debt-equity in determining a firm’s capital 
structure (Maness & Zietlow, 2005). This 
view is supported by Barton and Gordon 
(1987) and Berger and Udell (1998), who 
found that executive behaviour on corporate 
financial decisions making was influenced 
by company-specific factors such as risk 
and control, one’s behaviour such as norms, 
religion (culture), attitudes, preferences and 
desires. 
Such behavioural decisions are also 
based on the planned behaviour theory, 
in which antecedent intention is seen as 
a determinant of one’s behaviour and 
that intention is a function of attitude and 
subjective norms of behaviour (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1977). 
The subjective norm of behaviour in this 
study is the religion and religious values 
embraced by CEOs. Religions that people 
have faith in can shape behaviour throughout 
their lives and provide the foundation for 
their moral life, leading to the quality of self-
appreciation and attitude of people who tend 
to aspire to the noble values they believe in 
(Kum-Lung & Tek-Chai, 2010).
Every religion teaches and emphasises 
religious values that should not conflict 
with social norms. However, in the Islamic 
concept, any decision or act of conduct must 
be based on the Hadith and the Quran; for 
example, the use of funds related to interest is 
considered usurious and is a practice strictly 
forbidden (Ali-Imran [3]: 130), as affirmed 
in Indonesian Council of Ulema Decree No. 
1/2004. On the contrary, in Christianity, 
due to the great demand for capital to boost 
commerce and the economy, priests allow 
interest-bearing financing activity (usury) 
(Ackerman, 1981; Iannaccone, 1998; 
Noonan, 1993). In addition, in Hinduism, 
the concept of interest is written in the book 
of Manawa Dharmasastra VIII, 142, in 
which it is considered very reasonable and 
acceptable. On the other hand, the books of 
Buddhist and Confucian teachings do not 
discuss the subject of interest, as they put 
more emphasis on philosophical teaching. 
This indicates that there may be differences 
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in individual behaviour when making a 
company’s financing decisions based on 
the religious teaching that an individual has 
received.
Previous research has found that the 
cultural/religious characteristics of a region 
affect capital structure decisions, with 
firms located in Catholic-majority regions 
tending to have larger debts than those in 
Protestant-dominated ones (Baxamusa & 
Jalal, 2014). This is because there are wide 
differences between Catholics and Catholic 
characteristics and Protestant culture. 
Protestants believe that the economic 
benefits of property ownership should 
accrue to the owners. In contrast, Catholics 
consider property to be more of a social 
good. This difference is important, as it 
has implications for ownership rights and, 
by extension, stock ownership. Second, 
Protestants believe that each individual 
should determine what is right for himself 
other-self. In contrast, the Catholic Church 
is the arbiter of the common good. Stulz 
and Williamson (2003) suggested that this 
difference had led to Protestants being more 
individualistic than Catholics.
On the other hand, Gunn and Shackman 
(2014) found that there was no significant 
difference in terms of debt ratios between 
Islamic and non-Islamic countries. 
However, different findings were made 
by Abraham (2013), that Islam had a 
significant negative effect on the formation 
of the capital structure of banks in Saudi 
Arabia, where state-owned banks tended 
to have lower debts than those with foreign 
ownership. The most recent research in 
Asia conducted by Jiang et al. (2015) 
found that the religiosity of family business 
founders with Western religions (Islam, 
Catholicism or Protestantism) had debts 
and risks that tended to be lower than those 
practicing other religions. Meanwhile, the 
religiosity of family business founders with 
Eastern religions (Buddhism or Taoism) 
had no significant impact. This study 
aims to develop the research of Baxamusa 
and Jalal (2014) and Jiang et al. (2015), 
focusing on CEOs’ religious behaviour and 
religious values, and the effects of these 
on a company’s capital structure. A CEO’s 
religious values are the ethical norms that 
serve as the reference for the personal 
norms for a corporate leader, as governed 
by Financial Services Authority Regulation 
No. 33/POJK.04/2014, such as the morality 
and obligation to lead and manage for the 
benefit of the company. The morality of 
executives reflects their behaviour in terms 
of not deviating from the provisions based 
on the norms of society in general, such as 
being honest, and not committing corruption 
or other disgraceful acts. Such executive 
behaviour can be indicated by ascertaining 
whether executives are involved in fraud 
cases (Grullon et al., 2009). A manager with 
stronger morality and integrity should have 
better religiosity, thus preventing directors, 
managers and employees of the company 
from committing fraud (Dyreng et al., 2012; 
McGuire et al., 2012). Persons (1995), 
Spathis (2002) and Skousen et al. (2009) 
found that the tendency for fraudulent 
actions seen in financial statements was 
related to financial leverage. Other executive 
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religious values and norms include the 
obligation to lead and manage the company 
for its own benefit by considering the 
principles of good corporate governance. 
The implementation of good corporate 
governance is an important part of the 
effort to improve compant efficiency, as it is 
expected to reduce corporate agency costs 
and to keep the moral hazard behaviour 
of management/corporate executives at 
bay (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
role of executives is reflected in their 
attendance at board meetings. At such 
meetings, proactive CEOs will participate in 
formulating strategic decisions, overseeing 
the planning, monitoring ethical behaviour, 
ensuring the accuracy of financial reporting 
and legal compliance, implementing good 
governance effectively, and protecting the 
interests of stakeholders (Rezaee, 2004). 
Chen and Chen (2012) found that regular 
board meetings could help allocate capital 
very efficiently, while Achchuthan et al. 
(2013) and Khan and Wasim (2016) found 
that CEOs’ attendance at meetings had a 
significant positive effect on leverage.
This research is focused on public 
companies in Indonesia. Indonesian data are 
used because first the situation in Indonesia 
is very different from that in developed 
countries, although the fact that Muslims 
comprise the majority of the population 
(BPJS Centre, 2010) may not be reflected in 
the behaviour of businesses in the country. 
Based on preliminary data collected by 
the researchers through the observation of 
1,386 samples (2010-2015), 34.2% of CEOs 
are Muslim; 48.3% are Christian (Catholic 
and Protestant), and 17.5% are in other 
categories (Confucian, Hindu, Buddhist and 
Atheist). Second, CEOs play an important 
role companies, being responsible for 
all corporate business matters, including 
legal issues relating to the business of the 
company (Financial Services Authority 
Regulation No. 60/POJK.04/2016). Third, 
the reason for using Indonesian data is one 
of practicality. 
Referring to the literature discussed 
above, it can be concluded that the main 
proposition of this paper is that corporate 
financial decisions vary, particularly those 
related to capital structure, and this variation 
seems to be related to differences in the 
religious behaviour and values of CEOs. 
The research findings indicate that if 
companies with Christian CEOs (Catholic or 
Protestant) tend to have greater debt levels 
compared to CEOs of different religions 
(Abraham, 2013), it is suggested that such 
companies adopt better policies to protect 
shareholder rights and to improve stock 
market efficiency in order to encourage 
greater market share participation (Stulz 
& Williamson, 2003). On the other hand, 
with regard to Muslim CEOs, there appears 
to be no significant impact to debt, perhaps 
because they are less obedient in practising 
their religious teachings and the financial 
decisions they make are more likely to be 
influenced by other directors.
It was found that religious values 
reflected in fraudulent acts show that the 
CEOs involved in fraud cases tend to have 
a higher level of debt compared to others. 
Companies should apply consistent law 
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enforcement to keep moral hazard practices 
in check to help achieve an information-
efficient capital market in trading activities 
in the Indonesian capital market. CEO 
attendance at board meetings has a significant 
positive impact on corporate debt level. 
CEOs tend to be risk-takers when choosing 
sources of funding to expand corporate 
business and in the aggressive exploitation 
of investment opportunities by management 
(Achchuthan et al., 2013). Therefore, it is 
expected that companies will implement 
good corporate governance, transparent 
principles, accountability, responsibility, 
and independence and fairness of corporate 
governance, which should lead to the 
disbursement of funds based on calculated 
risk, without exceeding the maximum limit 
of debtors’ lending ratings.
The remainder of the paper is organised 
as follows. Section 2 addresses relevant 
literature and presents the study hypothesis. 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology 
of the study, while Section 4 presents and 
discusses the results. Section 5 provides the 
robustness test results, and Section 6 is the 
closing statement.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
Management and styles related to risk 
preferences play a role in debt-equity 
combinat ions  when determining a 
company’s capital structure (Maness & 
Zietlow, 2005). This argument is supported 
by Barton and Gordon (1987) and Berger 
and Udell (1998), who found that executive 
behaviour when taking financial decisions, 
apart from being influenced by company-
specific factors related to risk and control, 
was also influenced by behavioural factors 
such as norms, religion (culture), attitudes, 
preferences and desires. Such behavioural 
is also based on the theory of planned 
behaviour, in which the antecedent of 
intention is seen as a determinant of one’s 
behaviour, and that will is a function of 
attitude and subjective norms on behaviour 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). The subjective 
behavioural norms in this study are the 
religion and religious values of the CEO.
Mittelstaedt (2002) found that religion 
and religious institutions influenced the 
economy through various market activities 
and the government (Smith, 2007). Religions 
play an important role in everyday life and 
people’s ethical behaviour (Weaver & 
Agle, 2002). Religions shape the entire life 
of individuals and provide the foundation 
for morality, leading to the quality of 
comprehension and attitude of those who 
tend aspire to the noble values in which they 
believe (Kum-Lung & Tek-Chai, 2010).
People who are raised religiously 
exhibit the same beliefs and preferences, 
even when they reject religion as adults. 
Similarly, they find that cultural traits persist 
from generation to generation, even when 
the underlying institutional factors have 
changed substantially (Guiso et al., 2002). 
A person’s attitude cannot be separated 
from the activity of deciding how to behave. 
This decision on behaviour is based on 
behavioural intention as a function of attitude 
and the subjective norms of behaviour 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1977). The subjective norms of behaviour in 
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this study are reflected in CEOs’ religious 
behaviour and their religious values in the 
form of ethics and morality, which should 
serve as a reference for owners/managers in 
running their businesses.
Indonesia is the largest Muslim country 
in the world, with Islamic followers 
constituting 87.18% of the country’s 
population (BPJS Centre, 2010), but this 
is not reflected in the business conditions 
of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Preliminary data collected by 
the researchers comprised a sample of 
Muslim CEOs (34.2%), Christian (Catholic 
and Protestant) CEOs (48.3%), and others 
categories (Confucian, Hindu, Buddhist and 
Atheists) (17.5%) from the observation of 
1,386 sample. 
Therefore, the proxy for the CEOs’ 
religious behaviour in this study is not seen 
from the religious denomination of the 
religious territory of the company (Baxamusa 
& Jalal, 2014; Gunn & Shackman, 2014), 
but is viewed from the religious behaviour of 
the CEOs, whose religion is predominantly 
embraced on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
by assuming that they have the same 
level of obedience as their Muslim and 
Christian (Catholic and Protestant) peers, 
as is the case of CEOs with other beliefs 
(Confucian, Buddhist, Hindu and Atheist). 
Therefore, CEOs’ religious values  serve 
as a proxy for measuring their belief in 
the norms of their religious teachings, 
namely honesty, discipline, responsibility 
and a high standard of morality as reflected 
in their ethical values,  together with the 
responsibility of CEOs who are involved 
in moral hazard (fraud) cases and their 
attendance as directors at board meetings 
(Financial Services Authority Regulation 
No. 33/POJK.04/2014).
Abraham (2013) found that the religious 
characteristics of a particular country, in this 
case where Muslims were in the majority, 
had a significant influence on the formation 
of the capital structure of banks in Saudi 
Arabia, where state-owned banks had lower 
debt than those with foreign ownership. 
Islam has regulated in sharia and the Quran 
that the source of interest-bearing funding 
(usury) is strictly proscribed by Islamic law, 
as stated in Surah 2 (Al Baqarah) verses 275 
and 278, and Surah 3 (Ali Imran) verse 130. 
This is reinforced by a fatwa issued by the 
Indonesian Council of Ulema (Fatwa No. 
1/2004).
This is supported by research conducted 
by Jiang et al. (2015), who found that 
the founders of family corporations who 
embraced the religions of the West (Islam, 
Protestantism and Catholicism) had less debt 
and risk, while those who embraced religions 
of the East (Buddhism and Confucianism), 
their decision making on corporate were not 
influenced by their behavior at all. Western 
religions typically preach the existence of 
one supernatural God whom their followers 
worship and with whom they believe that 
they can communicate with, while Eastern 
religions often teach a “philosophy of life” 
rather than contend that there is a single God 
who interacts with followers. The ultimate 
goal for adherents of Western religions is 
salvation or eternal life, while the ultimate 
goal for adherents of Eastern ones is 
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enlightenment. The adherents of Eastern 
religions may not be risk averse, as these 
religions teach acceptance of uncertainty 
rather than offering salvation to overcome 
this and any related anxiety. Miller and 
Hoffmann (1995) found that followers of 
Western religions were risk averse, while 
followers of Eastern religions were not. 
Different results were obtained by 
Baxamusa and Jalal (2014), namely that 
companies in Catholic regions had higher 
debt than those located in Protestant areas. 
This is consistent with the view of Christian 
reformers (16th Century to 1836), that 
Christianity should allow interest-bearing 
loans for capital and business activities. 
This view is reinforced in Deuteronomy 
23:20, which allows for the provision of 
interest-bearing loans to foreigners. Based 
on the above sources, the behaviour of a 
person (CEO) in an organization is also 
influenced by other factors, such as religion 
he or she adheres to. Religions that one 
believes relate to their daily behaviour 
and form the entire life of individuals that 
provides a moral foundation for their life 
in daily  and  the organizations where they 
work (Conrad et al., 1998). The attitude and 
behaviour of individuals indicate the extent 
to which they are committed to the beliefs of 
religious teachings (Kum-Lung & Tek-Chai, 
2010). Kennedy and Lawton (1998) found 
that religion was the key social mechanism 
which influenced people’s beliefs and 
behaviour. Based on the above description, 
the influence of CEOs’ religion on capital 
structure is posited as follows: 
H1a: Muslim CEOs have lower 
corporate debts than those of other religions.
H1b: Christian CEOs (Catholic and 
Protestant) have higher corporate debts 
than those of other religions.
Religious values  in this study are 
measured by fraud committed by CEOs 
and their attendance at board meetings. 
The recent moral crisis of entrepreneurs 
demonstrates ethical violations committed 
by corporate executives at both international 
and national levels. To control the unethical 
behaviour of managers, religious values 
are required  as a social mechanism, which 
in turn limit unethical corporate practices. 
Dyreng et al. (2012) and McGuire et al. 
(2012) found that firms with strict socio-
religious norms had higher accrual qualities 
and lower accounting fraud risks. 
According to Chen and Steiner (1999), 
the tendency of companies to commit 
breaches of credit agreements may result 
in financial distress, due to an increase in 
corporate debt. This is because a company’s 
management will choose to use accounting 
methods that will shrink leverage ratios 
by shifting future earnings periods to 
the current period, when firms have high 
leverage ratios (Watt & Zimmerman, 1990).
On the other hand, fraudulent behaviour 
by companies increases information 
asymmetry between them  and creditors. 
As a result, creditors need to monitor the 
company more strictly, which increases 
monitoring costs and will be reflected in 
increased interest rates and a reduction in 
the number of loans granted (Chen et al., 
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2011). Creditors will consider the financial 
status of a company when signing contracts 
with it by using an effective monitoring 
system. Wei (2006) found a clear positive 
relationship between loans provided by 
creditors and a company’s financial status. 
Any fraud committed by a company will 
change creditors’ expectations of its risks 
and information, which will affect loans 
made to it. This argument is supported by the 
findings of Chen et al. (2011), namely that 
if companies are involved in fraud cases, 
this will have a significant negative impact 
on the amount of debt that will be provided 
by creditors in the short term. Based on 
the above description, the influence of a 
CEO who commits fraud related to capital 
structure is posited thus:
H2: CEOs who are involved in fraud 
cases have lower corporate debt than those 
who are not. 
Poor performance by a company leads 
the government to pay more attention 
to its board of directors. It does this by 
stimulating the board’s activities to to 
more increase  monitoring and control  to 
the company (Sarbanes, 2002). Therefore, 
CEOs’ monitoring of the company’s 
operational performance and sustainability 
is considered as an important aspect of their 
obligations. The General Guidelines of 
Good Corporate Governance of Indonesia 
of 2006 stipulates that one of the structures 
and working mechanisms that should be 
reported regularly is the number of meetings 
held by the board. 
C E O s  h a v e  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f 
responsibility and integrity in performing 
their duties and obligations as directors, 
a measure of responsibility and integrity 
CEO one of which is to ensure CEOs’ 
attendance at board meetings. More frequent 
meetings by the board of directors can 
improve the quality of the supervision of its 
managers (Vafeas, 1999) and provide more 
opportunities for discussions on company 
performance (Schwartz-Ziv & Weisbach, 
2013).
Achchuthan et al. (2013) found that 
there was a positive relationship between the 
number of board meetings and a company’s 
leverage.  They stated that board meetings 
had a significant positive effect on capital 
structure decisions because the number 
of meetings regularly attended by CEOs 
tend to increase the level of corporate debt 
when pursuing an optimal capital structure 
by minimising average capital costs and 
maximising the value of the company 
(Kajananthan, 2012). This indicates that 
the more frequently meetings are held, the 
more likely it is the debt ratio will increase.
Based on the concept of the trade-off 
theory, companies prefer debt to stocks 
when they have to spend external funds, 
as the cost of debt is considered cheaper 
than that of equity (Hansen & Crutchley, 
1990). More board meetings result in a 
higher debt level in pursuing an optimal 
capital structure, which minimises the 
average capital cost of the company. This 
indicates that when meetings are held more 
frequently, the debt ratio will increase. The 
associated hypothesis is as follows:
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H3: The frequency of CEOs’ attendance 
at  board meetings has a significant positive 
effect on the company’s debt level.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data on the debt-to-equity ratio, attendance, 
and control variables such as age, educational 
background of the CEOs, size, return on 
assets (ROA), standard deviation of ROA 
(SDROA), investment opportunity set 
(IOS), and firm age presented in companies’ 
financial reports from 2010 to 2015 were 
obtained from http://www.idx.co.id. The 
data collection was based on the purposive 
sampling method employing several criteria 
such as that companies should have positive 
equity, while sharia-originated financing was 
excluded. The religion of CEOs religions 
was measured based on the dominant 
religions present at IDX: Islam, Christianity 
(Catholic and Protestant), and other beliefs 
(Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism and 
Atheism).
The CEOs’ rel igious data were 
obtained through interviews with corporate 
secretaries, online media, magazines and 
newspapers. This variable used the dummy 
symbolised as DRelCEO, where DRelCEOIslam_
others, dummy variable 1 as Muslim CEOs, 
0 = CEOs who embrace other religions, 
and DRelCEOChristian_others, dummy variable 1 
as Christian CEOs, and 0 are CEOs who 
embrace other religions. 
The basic idea of classifying religions 
in the study was based on the dominant 
religion of its adherents in Indonesian firms, 
with Muslim CEOs at 34.2%, Christian 
CEOs (Catholic and Protestant) at 48.3%, 
and others (Confucian, Hindu, Buddhist and 
Atheist) at 17.5%, based on the observations 
from the 1,386 samples. 
Religious values  were represented by 
the CEO in cases of fraud. Fraud is defined 
as an act of deliberate deception by a person 
or an entity that knows that such an action 
may result in harm to another individual 
or entity (Audit Board of The Republic of 
Indonesia Audit [BPK], 2013). This variable 
used a dummy denoted by DFr, with a 
dummy variable 1, if the company/board 
of directors was involved in fraud cases, or 
0 otherwise. The fraud data were obtained 
by taking the following steps: 1) searching 
online media, magazines and newspapers to 
detect CEOs involved in fraud cases from 
2010 to 2015; 2) cross-checking data with 
the names of CEOs involved in fraud cases 
with the data available at the Corruption 
Eradication Commission/ Financial Services 
Authority; and 3) using Indonesian positive 
law as a measure of fraud committed by 
a company/management, starting from 
suspects, defendants and convicted persons. 
The other religious value was the frequency 
of CEO attendance at board meetings, as 
represented by the percentage of attendance. 
This variable is denoted as AttdCEO. The 
following equation was used to examine the 
influence of religion and religious values  on 
capital structure :
DERit =αoi+ β1 DRELit- β2 DFRit + β3 
ATTDit- β4AGEit + β5DEDUit + β6 SIZEit-
β7ROAit -β8SDROAit-β9IOSit-β10AgFit+eit    
Rida Rahim, Cynthia Afriani Utama and Rofikoh Rokhim
140 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum.27 (S2): 131 - 151 (2019)
Data Analysis Technique
The model selection analysis was performed 
between the pooled least square (PLS) 
model and the fixed effect model (FEM) and 
then between the FEM and the random effect 
model (REM), as can be seen in the Chow 
test and Haussman test results. The Chow 
test results show that Prob = 0.0000 for 
the cross-section F, which is less than 0.05, 
resulting in the rejection of H0. Therefore, 
it can be concluded with a confidence level 
of 95% that the panel model is better than 
the common effect model (CEM). The 
Haussman test was then conducted, which 
showed that Prob = 0.0906 for the random 
cross-section, which is greater than 0.05, 
implying that H0 is rejected, so it can be 
concluded that with a 95% confidence 
level that the FEM is better than the REM. 
The results of the Chow and Haussmann 
tests show that the FEM is more suitable 
than the REM for use as the panel data 
regression model. The descriptive statistical 
analysis shown in Tables 1 and 2 describes 
the company-specific variables of religion, 
fraud and attendance. The debt equity ratio 
(DER) is the ratio of total debt to total equity, 
while the control variable is a determinant 
variable that affects capital structure. CEO 
age and company size is the natural log of 
total assets. Profitability (return on assets) 
is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. Business 
risk is the standard deviation of ROA; the 
investment opportunity set is formulated as 
market value divided by asset value (MB/
VA) = [total assets - total equity + number 
of shares outstanding x stock closing price] 
/ total assets. Company age, CEO religion, 
CEO education background and fraud are 
the dummy variables. 
Based on the descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 1, the average proportion 
of the debt to equity ratio of all firms in 
the sample is 120.7%. The average use 
of corporate debt is greater than equity, 
indicating that companies tend to use 
debt rather than their equity for corporate 
financing (Mayers & Majluf, 1984). The 
frequency of CEO attendance at board 
meetings at all companies in the sample is 
94%, indicating that such presence was quite 
frequent for companies on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
DER AttdCEO AgeCEO SIZE ROA SDROA IOS AgFirm
Mean 1.207 0.940 54.000 24.189 0.110 0.0120 1.394 10.328
Median 0.876 0.980 54.000 26.311 0.091 0.0060 1.078 10.275
Maximum 4.130 1.000 86.000 34.708 0.683 0.3420 7.586 11.552
Minimum 0.020 0.460 49.000 11.518 -0.777 0.0002 0.044 8.006
Std. Dev. 1.091 0.094 9.169 4.974 0.130 0.0200 0.953 9.650
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Table 2 illustrates that the proportion 
of CEOs committing fraud was 11.8% 
of the sample, demonstrating the fraud 
committed by those CEOs according to 
their religion. The highest number of 
fraud cases was in line with the following 
religions: 47.56% for Christian directors; 
29.88% for Muslim directors; and 22.56% 
for those with different beliefs. Observing 
the percentage of fraud committed by the 
CEOs of other religions (Confucianism, 
Buddhism and Hinduism), the figure is quite 
high, at 22.56%. This shows that fraud can 
be committed by any CEO, regardless of 
their religious background.
Table 3 shows the results of the 
regression assumption test, in which the 
data are normally distributed (Walpole, 
1982). The correlation value between 
the independent variables indicates that 
there is no indication of multicollinearity. 
This can be seen from the correlation 
between independent variables of <0.8; 
this shows that the correlation between the 
independent variables is not an indication 
of multicollinearity, autocorrelation or 
heteroscedasticity, thus the above regression 
model can be used in the study.
Table 2
Category variable
Fraud Non 
Fraud
Economy Non 
Economy
Islam Christian
(Catholic & 
Protestant)
Others 
(Khonghucu, 
Budhist, 
Hindu, 
Atheis)
Frequency 164 1.222 616 770 474 670 242
Percentage 88.2 11.8 44.4 55.6 34.2 48.3 17.5
Islam Christian
 (Catholic & 
Protestant)
Others 
(Khonghucu, 
Budhist, 
Hindu, 
Atheis)
Fraud
(mean)
29.88 47.56 22.56
Attd
(mean)
0.89 0.88 0.90
Note: In terms of the CEO’s religion, the dummy variable 1 represents Muslim CEOs and 0 is for others, 
and the dummy variable 2 represents Christian CEO’s and 0 is for others. For the fraud variable, the dummy 
variable 1 represents CEOs who have committed fraud and 0 is for others. For the educational background 
variable, the dummy variable 1 represents CEOs with economics as their educational background and 0 is 
for others.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Table 4 presents the results of the multiple 
linear regression test with the fixed effect 
model.  Obviously,  many company-
specific factors can explain the level of 
debt recorded by a company. Therefore, 
the main independent company control 
variables include age, the educational 
background of the CEOs, size, ROA, 
SDROA, IOS and AgFirm. The estimation 
results and statistical model of H1b, H2 and 
H3 show a significant impact of religion, 
fraud, attendance and CEO age on capital 
structure. This suggests that Christian 
CEOs in Indonesian public companies tend 
to have a higher debt level than those who 
believe in other religions, as indicated by a 
positive and significant coefficient of 1%. 
The results related to H1b follow the study 
proposition and are in line with research 
by Abraham (2013), Baxamusa and Jalal 
(2014) and Jiang et al. (2015) namely that 
religion influences decisions on the capital 
structure of companies. This study provides 
evidence that the behaviour of a CEO in an 
organization is influenced not only by the 
internal and external factors of the company, 
but also by another factor, namely the 
religion of the CEO. Religion is believed 
to be related to daily behaviour and shapes 
the entire life of individuals, providing the 
foundation for moral life and leading to the 
quality of life and attitude of those.  
The attitudes and behaviours of 
individuals indicate the extent to which 
they are committed to their religious beliefs 
(Kum-Lung & Tek-Chai, 2010). This is 
indicated by the behaviour of Christian 
CEOs, whose religious teachings allow 
interest-bearing loans (Iannonce, 1998; 
Jiang et al., 2015). Therefore, there is a 
tendency for them to use debt as a corporate 
source of funds, indicating that the religious 
teachings trusted by CEOs are reflected in 
deliberate behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1977). H1a is 
rejected, implying that Muslim CEOs do not 
have an influence on capital structure. This 
result shows that Muslim CEOs may be less 
devoted to their religion and less obedient 
to the teachings of Islam. It also applies to 
CEOs’ religious values. CEOs involved in 
Regression 
assumption
Test Test result
Normality JB-test :0.000<α =5% Abnormal, because of the amount data 
>1000, said approach normal data central 
limit theory, Walpole (1991)
Multicollinearity Correlation between 
independent variables <0.8
No multicollinearity
Autocorrelation Dwstat 
0.97099<Dwstat<2.05436
Durbin Watson 1.506024 this study is an 
independent autocorrelation test
Heterokedasticity Obs*R Squared 0.2484 >α -5% No heterokedasticity
Table 3
Testing assumption regression
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fraud cases tend to have larger debts than 
other CEOs, as indicated by a positive and 
significant coefficient of 1%. 
The result of H2 is different to the 
research of Chen et al. (2011), that companies 
involved in fraud cases will experience a 
significant negative impact on the amount 
of debt provided by creditors, as fraud will 
cause information asymmetry between the 
company and its creditors/funders. This 
finding relates to research conducted by 
Qiang (2003) and Scott (2006), who found 
that managers involved in fraud cases 
preferred to take more risks. This means that 
there is a tendency for the company/board of 
directors involved in fraud to have greater 
Table 4
Regression result  of religion and religious values to capital structure
Coefficient
(Std Error)
Constant 0.286***
(0,0113)
RelCEOIslam_O 0.0053
(0,036)
RelCEOKristen_O 0.1145**
(0,0265)
FraudCEO 0.1084***
(0,0252)
AttdCEO 0.1364**
(0,0569)
AgeCEO 0.0072**
(0,0015)
EduCEO -0.1026
(0.0145)
SIZE 0.0137
(0.0039)
ROA -0.3545***
(0.0647)
SDROA 0.1854**
(0.0147)
IOS -0.0145**
(0.0056)
AgFirm 0.0173***
(0.0024)
Adjusted R2 0.511
No. of Obs
Firm-Year
1.386
Note: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
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debts than others. CEO attendance at board 
meetings (H3) has a significant positive 
effect on corporate debts, indicating that 
debts still provide a higher return than the 
cost of the debts themselves (Kajananthan, 
2012).
CEO age has a significant positive effect 
on corporate debt, indicating that the older 
the CEO, the higher the company debt. This 
suggests that older CEOs are more willing to 
take risks and use more debts, tending to be 
overconfident. The finding is different to that 
of Kyenze (2014), who found that there was 
a significant relationship between capital 
structure and age; companies that had old 
board members tended to choose leverage or 
a low debt ratio compared to young boards. 
Educational background has no significant 
effect on capital structure, as every company 
requires different skills according to its 
needs (Kusumastuti et al., 2007).
The regression results also show that 
firm size has no significant relationship with 
debt, which is in line with Modigiani & 
Miller (1958). Profitability has a significant 
negative effect on the level of company 
debt. This empirical evidence suggests that 
higher corporate profitability has a low debt 
ratio, indicating that the company owns and 
employs a substantial amount of internal 
funding (Mayers & Majluf, 1984; Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995).
Business risk has a significant positive 
effect on the level of company debt. This 
empirical evidence shows the higher the 
company risk, the greater the debts required 
to finance its investment. The preference of 
boards of directors/corporate management 
in Indonesia with regard to risk is as risk-
seekers. This is because funds derived 
from debts still provide additional benefits 
(return) that are greater than the required 
cost of funds due to business uncertainty 
(Hansen & Crutchley, 1990). Investment 
opportunity set (IOS) has a significant 
negative impact on a company’s capital 
structure; companies with a high IOS tend 
to use internal funding sources. 
This condition is inseparable from 
the cost incurred from corporate funding 
choices. Future investment options selected 
by management are expected to result in a 
greater return compared to the cost of equity 
and can provide benefits to the company 
(Kallapur & Trombley, 1999). Investors 
will take account of companies with better 
growth for their investments due to the stock 
return gained by them in the future. 
Company age has a significant positive 
impact on debt, indicating that a company 
needs external funding until its situation 
reaches an optimum level (Van der Wijst, 
1989).
Robustness Test
The next robustness test was conducted as 
shown in Table 5. For the first robustness 
test, a different dependent variable was 
used, i.e. the debt-to-total assets ratio, since 
this debt ratio reflects another proxy for 
measuring a company’s capital structure 
(Baxamusa & Jalal, 2014). The first column 
of Table 5 shows the estimated coefficients, 
which are consistent with the previous 
finding. It is found that Christian CEOs and 
debts have a significant relationship, with 
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a significant probability at a statistically 
significant level of 1%, while fraud and 
attendance showed significance levels of 
1% and 10%.
The results of the robustness test show 
that the variables of religious behaviour and 
religious values have a significant impact 
on decisions regarding firms’ debt level, 
which is similar to the test results for the 
debt-to-equity ratio shown in Table 4. For 
the control variables, the age of directors, 
ROA and company age have a significant 
impact on the debt ratio, with the same 
direction coefficient as in previous findings. 
For the second robustness test, a different 
size of sample, with the value of the debt-
to-equity ratio surpassing the mean value, 
was used. The results show that the variables 
of religious behaviour and values have a 
significant impact on decisions regarding 
corporate debt, with a significance level of 
5% for Christian CEOs on other religions, 
fraud with a significance level of 1 % and 
and attendance significance level of 5%, 
which is consistent with previous findings. 
The results of this study show consistent 
evidence that religions and values influence 
CEOs’ behaviour in determining corporate 
capital structure. In addition, the controls of 
ROA, StdROA, IOS and Agfirm companies 
have a significant impact on the debt rasio, 
with the same coefficients and directions as 
in previous findings. It is recognised that the 
results on behaviour based on the religion 
and religious values of the directors towards 
capital structure decisions in this study 
are purely empirical. It is confirmed that 
developing a theory for this relationship is 
more challenging than building its existence, 
as stated by Hilary and Hui (2009) and 
Jiang et al. (2015), “That religious people 
seem to avoid risk”, and this tends to affect 
companies’ decision making.
Table 5 (Robustness Test)
Regression result  of religion and religious values to capital structure
(1) Coefficient (Std Error) (2) Coefficient (Std Error)
Constant 0.2147***
(0.0445)
0.3103***
(0.0523)
RelCEOIslam_O 0.05667
(0.0142)
0.0846
(0.0127)
RelCEOKristen_O 0.0625***
(0.0143)
0.0742**
(0.0118)
FraudCEO 0.0568*
(0.013)
0.042***
(0.041)
AttdCEO 0.1247*
(0.045)
0.3462**
(0.0281)
AgeCEO 0.0025*
(0.0014)
-0.0016
(0.0036)
EduCEO 0.0046
(0.0125)
0.0218
(0.0518)
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CONCLUSIONS
CEOs’ religion and religious values 
contribute to different decisions on corporate 
debt levels (Abraham, 2013; Baxamusa 
& Jalal, 2014; Jiang et al., 2015). This 
study contributes to the existing literature 
with the finding that CEOs’ decisions on 
corporate financing are influenced not only 
by financial and risk factors, but also by their 
religious behaviour and values,  which can 
explain decisions on capital structure. The 
results of the study indicate that Christian 
CEOs tend to favour a greater degree of 
debt than those with other religions; it was 
the view of the Christian reformers (16th 
Century to 1836) that Christianity should 
allow interest-bearing debts in obtaining 
funding (Hilary & Hui, 2009), although 
some Christians forbid interest on money or 
usury in their lives. However, these results 
indicate that there is a non-financial factor 
affecting CEOs’ decisions, namely that 
their religion is based on beliefs in religious 
teachings that have been embedded and are 
reflected in the organizational behaviour 
of CEOs at the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
Therefore, it is expected that Christian 
CEOs at the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
should adopt better corporate governance 
policies, such as improving the quality of 
risk management committees, committee 
independence, and the reputation of audit 
committees to protect shareholder rights 
and improve stock market efficiency, in 
an effort to encourage greater shareholder 
participation (Stulz & Williamson, 2003). 
As for Muslim CEOs, they have no 
significant impact on corporate debts. This 
is because Muslim CEOs are probably not so 
obedient to their religious teachings, since 
Table 5 (Continued)
(1) Coefficient (Std Error) (2) Coefficient (Std Error)
EduCEO 0.0046
(0.0125)
0.0218
(0.0518)
SIZE 0.0034
(0.0013)
0.0112
(0.0065)
ROA -0.1045**
(0.0326)
-0.4516***
(0.0136)
SDROA -0.1446 0.3056**
IOS
(0.0132)
-0.0043
(0.0014)
(0.0158)
-0.0475*
(0.0246)
AgFirm 0.0015***
(0.0004)
0.0048**
(0.0019)
Adjusted R2 0.558 0.436
No. of Obs
Firm-Year
1.386 336
Note: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
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their decisions are also influenced by the 
behaviour of other board members of the 
company. Besides, it is also probably due 
to the small number of companies running 
sharia-based businesses which are listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange. This means 
external funding policy the company’s at the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange, tends to be in the 
form of loans sourced from conventional 
banking
It was also found that the religious 
values of CEOs are reflected in their 
involvement in fraudulent acts. The 
involvement of CEOs in fraudulent act 
tends to make their companies have more 
debt than other CEOs. The situation is 
explained by the fact  that fraud committed 
by management, such as overstated sales, 
repo transactions and corruption tends to be 
associated with a larger debt ratio. Such a 
ratio means the company has to bear a heavy 
burden to fulfil its contractual clauses with 
creditors/investors, driving it to attempt to 
manage reported earnings by reducing or 
increasing profits to provide the impression 
of better corporate performance. Therefore, 
to overcome fraud there is a need for 
good corporate governance management, 
transparency, accountable financial 
statements, and fairness in providing debt 
or loans that do not exceed the maximum 
limit of debt ratings.
Implications
CEO attendance at the board meetings 
is positively related to capital structure, 
implying that debt usage still generates a 
higher return if compared to the cost of 
the debt itself. This is because the number 
of meetings attended by CEOs tends to 
increase the level of corporate debt in 
pursuing an optimal capital structure by 
minimising average capital costs and 
maximising the value of the company 
(Kajananthan, 2012). It is also possible that 
CEOs take more risks in taking advantage 
of existing investment opportunities and 
that the creditors feel more secure about 
the company’s loan repayments because of 
the CEO’s attendance at board meetings. 
The results of this test also indicate that a 
CEOs’ attendance at board meetings shows 
that they are proactive and participate in 
strategic decisions, oversee planning, and 
monitor management’s ethical behaviour 
(Rezaee, 2004), which provides a sense of 
security to creditors over repayment of what 
they have lent (Khan & Wasim, 2016).
The limitations of the study are that 
it measures the CEOs’ religion (Islam, 
Christian or others) by assuming that they 
have the same level of adherence to their 
respective religion. In reality, however, 
some CEOs have stronger beliefs and are 
more likely to follow religious doctrine 
than others of the same religion. Another 
limitation is related to the measurement 
of fraud variables based on the acts of 
CEOs who have committed fraud. Using 
Indonesian positive law, it takes time 
to declare someone who has allegedly 
committed a crime as a suspect and to be 
eventually convicted. Therefore, the data 
obtained could become invalid soon after 
the CEO suspected to have committed 
fraud is free from any criminal charge. 
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Moreover, the measurement of control 
variables does not include tangibility, tax, 
other determinants of corporate governance, 
such as independent committees, risk 
management committees or audit committee 
reputation. 
For future research, it would be better 
if the measurement of CEOs’ religiosity 
were also made by questioning them, as a 
deeper measurement of religiosity would 
provide a stronger test. The use of other 
cultural elements focused on the cultural 
dimensions identified by Hofstede(2001) 
would examine of a broader set of non-
economic factors.
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